Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions. For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key. Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/cry...@v0.31.0 enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth. Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance.

An attacker can craft an input to the Parse functions that would be processed non-linearly with respect to its length, resulting in extremely slow parsing. This could cause a denial of service.

golang-jwt is a Go implementation of JSON Web Tokens. Unclear documentation of the error behavior in `ParseWithClaims` can lead to situation where users are potentially not checking errors in the way they should be. Especially, if a token is both expired and invalid, the errors returned by `ParseWithClaims` return both error codes. If users only check for the `jwt.ErrTokenExpired ` using `error.Is`, they will ignore the embedded `jwt.ErrTokenSignatureInvalid` and thus potentially accept invalid tokens. A fix has been back-ported with the error handling logic from the `v5` branch to the `v4` branch. In this logic, the `ParseWithClaims` function will immediately return in "dangerous" situations (e.g., an invalid signature), limiting the combined errors only to situations where the signature is valid, but further validation failed (e.g., if the signature is valid, but is expired AND has the wrong audience). This fix is part of the 4.5.1 release. We are aware that this changes the behaviour of an established function and is not 100 % backwards compatible, so updating to 4.5.1 might break your code. In case you cannot update to 4.5.0, please make sure that you are properly checking for all errors ("dangerous" ones first), so that you are not running in the case detailed above.

When logs are written to a widely-writable directory (the default), an unprivileged attacker may predict a privileged process's log file path and pre-create a symbolic link to a sensitive file in its place. When that privileged process runs, it will follow the planted symlink and overwrite that sensitive file. To fix that, glog now causes the program to exit (with status code 2) when it finds that the configured log file already exists.

Controlled by an Kubernetes Operator. Asset docker.io/oryd/kratos

docker.io/oryd/kratos

main

Devguard-Pipeline

quay.io/jetstack/cert-manager-acmesolver

Devguard Postgresql

ghcr.io/l3montree-dev/devguard-operator

devguard-action

devguard-web

ghcr.io/l3montree-dev/devguard-postgresql

ghcr.io/l3montree-dev/devguard

devguard-scanner

devguard

 Devguard-Pipeline

DevGuard Operator

devguard-documentation

Devguard

Robot User

OpenCoDE

Sebastian Kawelke

Tim Bastin

Refaei Shikho

refoo0

L3montree Cybersecurity

Controlled by an Kubernetes Operator. Asset quay.io/jetstack/cert-manager-acmesolver

Controlled by an Kubernetes Operator. Asset ghcr.io/l3montree-dev/devguard-operator

Controlled by an Kubernetes Operator. Asset ghcr.io/l3montree-dev/devguard-postgresql

The scanner component of the devguard project

This is a scan for Devguard CI/CD components in a GitLab project, aimed at testing whether these components function correctly.

The documentation for the DevGuard Project

Manage your CVEs seamlessly, Integrate your Vulnerability Scanners, Documentation made easy, Compliance to security Frameworks - OWASP Incubating Project

Package	Max Risk	Total Risk	Flaw Count	Installed Version	Action
golang.org/x/crypto	4.3	4.3	1	0.26.0	Update to version 0.31.0 to reduce total risk by 4.3
golang.org/x/net	2.5	2.5	1	0.27.0	Update to version 0.33.0 to reduce total risk by 2.5
github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4	1.4	1.4	1	4.5.0	Update to version 4.5.1 to reduce total risk by 1.4
github.com/golang/glog	0.0	0.0	1	1.2.1	Update to version 1.2.4 to reduce total risk by 0.0
stdlib	0.0	0.0	2	1.23.2	Update to version 1.23.5 to reduce total risk by 0.0

L3montree Cybersecurity
Organization
/Devguard
Project
/docker.io/oryd/kratos
Asset

Identified Risks